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1 Introduction
This paper analyses empirically the effect of formal and informal institutional quality
on de novo firm entry rates in an emerging economy. Entry of new firms is often held
to be beneficial for economic efficiency and growth because new entrants stimulate
competition and efficiency and may also generate, disseminate and apply innovative
ideas (Audretsch and Acs (1991)). The competitive process of firm creation and
demise, however, does not exist in a vacuum and weak institutions may debilitate
entry and enhance the market power of incumbent firms, with harmful implications
for welfare. Even in developed economies, the efficiency enhancing impact of entry
relies on the operation of strong anti-monopoly laws but entry barriers may be even
higher in emerging markets. In this paper we explore the determinants of entry across
time, industries and regions in the largest transition economy, Russia (Shleifer and
Treisman (2005)). In order to do so, we exploit the concept of ”natural entry rates”
(Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006)) in advanced Western countries as a benchmark to
assess the impact of institutional variations on regional entry rates in a single national
economic entity. We focus both on formal institutional barriers, indicated by level of
economic development, industrialization rate, urban population share, poverty rate1,
as well as less formal institutional measures of the business environment variables, such
as legislative, political, economic, social and criminal risk2.
As Russia is a single political unit, much of the formal regulatory and institu-
tional framework is common across all regions, though being federal, some aspects are
decentralised. The Russian constitution gives the central government exclusive au-
thority in regulation of foreign trade, legal framework of a single market as well as
financial, currency and customs regulations (OECD (2002)). However, the remaining
great diversity among Russian regions allows us to explore the impact of institutional
variation on entry rates in a novel way. Previous studies (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006)) have analysed
cross-country variations in entry rates and suggested a link between entry rates and
the domestic institutional context. These studies, however, could only partially con-
trol for macroeconomic policy differences, trading regimes and numerous other country
specific factors. Our paper contributes to the debate on the institutional effect on entry
by exploring entry rates within a single country, which allows us to address regional
economic heterogeneity explicitly and to investigate regional institutional variation.
1This is, for example, important in order to distinguish ”export led” from ”market seeking” entry’s
strategies, as referred in the wide Foreign Direct Investment literature.
2For a review on the effect of institutions on economic performance and development see the
Symposium on Institutions and Economic Performance, Benerjee and Ghatak (2005).
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Our approach is facilitated by the use of novel and comprehensive longitudinal
enterprise data set of firms. Using it allows us to establish that entry rates are not
in fact particularly low in Russia, despite deficiencies in the formal institutional envi-
ronment. However, regional variation in institutional quality impacts on entry rates
relative to the levels that would pertain in Western economies. Industries that are
characterised by higher entry rates in Western economies experience lower entry in
regions with weaker institutions and higher business risk. The results are robust across
a variety of measures of ”natural entry rates” and of institutional quality.
The paper is organised as follows: in the second section we briefly review the
literature on entry in connection with institutions and the business environment; in
the third section the data set is described and the magnitude of entry is reported
across regions, industry and time; section four is dedicated to the empirical strategy
and section five to regression results; we draw our main conclusions in section six.
2 Literature
The literature on entry of new firms into a market focuses around the notion of barriers
to entry, which can be defined in terms of a cost for a new entrant which is not borne
by the incumbent (Bain (1968); Stigler (1968)). Barriers therefore generate rents
for incumbents (Gilbert (1989)). Bain (1949) identified the main determinants of
entry to be economies of scale, product differentiation and absolute cost advantage of
established firms. A considerable literature has emerged to analyse these phenomena
in a strategic and multi-firm setting (e.g. Dixit (1979) and Dixit (1981); Aghion and
Bolton (1987); Gilbert and Vives (1986), Carlton (2004)). The models have also
been widely tested on developed economy data (e.g. Orr (1974); Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson (1989); Geroski (1991); Caves (1998)) on the basis of equations linking
entry rates to measures of, for example, scale economies, sunk costs, market structure
and a variety of additional variables.
Since De Soto (1990) path-breaking work, analysts of entry in emerging markets
have suggested that regulation of entry represents a further entry barrier. It is argued
that regulation is introduced by policy makers in the interests of those that introduce
it, namely the pursuit of their own rents (bribes) (Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Eu-
ropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2005)). This implies that higher
levels of regulation will raise entry costs and reduce the rates of entry. North (1991)
has highlighted the impact of informal as well as formal institutions, which suggests
that entry barriers may also be higher in countries where the general business envi-
ronment is weaker. Weak legal and institutional environments raise the cost of doing
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business, for example the costs of enforcing contracts, and are typically associated
with higher level of corruption (Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton
(2000)). Importantly, these additional costs seem likely to bear more heavily on en-
trants than incumbents, who have developed expertise of operating in this environment
analogously to their experience in operating the technology. Hence poor institutional
environments are likely to enhance the advantages to incumbents yielded by higher
levels of regulation.
The empirical evidence on emerging markets strongly supports the predictions
with respect to regulations, but the argument with regard to institutions has rarely
been tested, but see Campos and Iootty (2007). Thus Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) report data on regulations of entry (start-ups) in 85
countries and find that there is a positive relationship between the size of informal
economy (in turn highly correlated with corruption), and the burden of the entry
regulation, measured by the number of procedures, time and cost of starting a firm.
Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) also find that regulations hinder entry, notably
those which are in naturally ”high entry” industries. However, regulations are found
to be not always welfare reducing; labour regulations reduce entry into labour inten-
sive sectors but property rights protection increases entry in R&D intensive sectors
(Bertrand and Kramarz (2002)). Ciccone and Papaionnaou (2007) find that entry
rates are higher when the time for registering new business is lower although this is
also influenced by demand and technology factors. According to the ‘Doing Business’
statistics compiled by the World Bank, Russia registers a high number of procedures to
be implemented in order to open a new business (especially for screening), but does not
impose high barriers in terms of registration’s time and cost. For example advanced
Western countries such as Austria and Italy impose significantly higher entry barriers
in terms of registration’s time and fees. According to these statistics, it appears that
Russia is only partially constrained by the regulatory environment, at least as far as
entry of new firms is concerned. However, the same country scores relatively high in
corruption levels as well as prevalence of informal economy3. This suggests that Russia
is a good place to test the impact of formal and informal regulatory barriers.
The discrepancy between relatively low formal regulations cost and high corrup-
tion index can be explained by the high impact of informal institutions. As argued
by Aidis and Estrin (2006) and Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2008), some stud-
ies tend to analyse de jure regulations by partially failing to measure the real costs
to entry. Transition countries, such as Russia, are characterised de facto by a much
more complex system of entry barriers or entry fostering mechanisms. According to
3E.g. Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal Index.
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these authors, institutional environment, informal networks and entrepreneurial activ-
ity play an important role in the process of entrepreneurship development. Formal
and informal institutions - laws and social norms - work side by side, whilst it is very
difficult to disentangle their marginal effect on firms’ economic performance. What
is more, Aidis and Adachi (2007) argue that the Doing Business Statistics compiled
by the World Bank could be misleading. In Russia ”regulatory uncertainty, lack of
enforcement, regional differences and unfair playing fields” are broadly diffused and
they are constantly affecting the process of opening and running a new business. Fur-
thermore, industry variation could be very high; for example, the IT sector appears to
be relatively less affected by entry barriers, even if it is still affected by bureaucrats
rent-seeking behaviour.
Similarly, Tybout (2000) points out that in least developed countries the cost of
entry varies with firm size and prevalence of shadow economy in a specific sector. In
such countries antitrust enforcement is very weak, the reason being that large firms
lobby legislative bodies to restrain entry of new firms, and to strengthen the incum-
bents’ power. Formal business licensing and labour laws constraints have a relatively
less important role. In other words, a judicial system is not working in a vacuum:
embedded social norms and informal institutions (networks, shared business practices,
etc.), play a crucial role. The difficulty lies in disentangling and measuring their effect.
Most recent studies have highlighted different aspects concerning the diffusion
of new entrepreneurs in connection with institutions: Klapper, Laeven and Rajan
(2006) focus on entry regulations’ effect on entry rates at the level of the country
by exploiting a difference in difference approach; Berkowitz and DeJong (2005) show
that Russian regional entrepreneurial activity exhibits a statistically and quantitatively
significant relationship with subsequent growth; Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2008)
analyse the link between institutions and entrepreneurial activity using the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor; the CEFIR (2007) Study of Administrative Barriers to
SMEs in Russia states that the enforcement of new regulations is lagging behind and
there is an ”increase in subjective perception of problems associated with corruption
and unfair rule of the game for SMEs growth and development”, especially in recent
years.
Therefore the question remains on how to apply these findings of the literature
on regulation and entry to the transition countries context. In Russia, for example, the
business environment is affected by high entry barriers and one might expect to find
low entry rates. However, it will be shown that this does not appear to be the case.
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3 Data Description
Russian regions provide a useful laboratory for research on potential factors affecting
entry rates. The large number of regions and the difference in their economic and
institutional environments (Popov (2001)) allows us to disentangle various institutional
factors and measure their effects on entry rates . The diversity of economic conditions
and the large scope for regional governments to influence local institutions have resulted
in significant divergence of regional development paths. Regions differ in their wealth,
populations’ income levels, risk of social tensions and administrative barriers to start-
ups. For example, while several regions have been shown to have a legislative climate
favourable to investors, such as Nizny Novgorod, Yaroslavl and Moscow regions, others,
such as Kursk and Magadan regions lag behind. At the same time, the financial
resources of rich regions such as Tyumen oblast significantly exceed those of poor
territories, such as the Ingush Republic. Below we will explore how these differences
affect entry rates in these regions. To our knowledge this is the first attempt to measure
effect of institutions on entry rates in Russia. Although previous attempts include work
by Berkowitz and DeJong (2005) on entrepreneurial activity in Russian regions, this
paper approximates new start ups by the number of SMEs already operating in the
region.
In order to explore the link between entry and institutional environment we com-
pile a dataset containing information on entry rates by industry, regions and years. The
data set covers measures of business environment as well as structural socio-economic
variables at the level of the region. To build our dataset we drew on three data sources:
1) Ruslana database, 2) Russian State Statistics Agency and 3) Expert RA regional
database.
The firm level panel data used in this paper is drawn from Ruslana database4 and
consists of firm level balance-sheet information spanning from 1997 to 2005, covering
around 70 % of registered firms in Russia in its latest release. Data cover industries
down to 4 digits and provide information on shareholders, company’s finances, employ-
ment count, firm’s location, legal status of the firm (e.g. limited liability companies,
single proprietorship, etc.), year of incorporation (as declared by the firm), and com-
pany name. This database closely matches information provided by Amadeus data
base5 and this will allow us to compare Russian entry rates to statistics provided by
other studies (e.g. Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006)) using the same definitions,
methodology and variables. However, unlike Amadeus, Ruslana does not have any
firm size restrictions; smaller firms are included in the data set.
4 c© copyright Bureau van Dijk, Credit Reform S. Petersburg.
5 c© copyright Bureau van Dijk.
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Notwithstanding the theoretical possibility to construct a panel between 1997
and 2005 (9 years), the 1997, 1998 and 1999 data have been excluded from the analysis
because of mis-reporting and missing values. The sample is reduced dramatically in
1999 (the year after the 1998 crisis) and this induces a strong selection effect on the
remaining firms. The firms reporting financial data in 1999 are likely to be less severely
affected by the crisis, while a significant part of the sample did not report financial
details. We avoid this effect by including observations on firms which report from 2000
onwards, when a consistent number of firms re-entered the database. As far as entry is
concerned, we want to assess its magnitude as independently as possible from sample
selection due to the shake-out of the 1998 crisis. Furthermore, virtually no firm reports
year of incorporation after 2002 and therefore the available years for the analysis are
restricted to 2000, 2001 and 2002.
Measurements of socio-economic characteristics of the regions were sourced from
Russian State Statistics Agency’s publications (former Goskomstat). Information from
the Russian State Statistics Agency was compiled for the period of 1995-2005, covering
all of the 89 Russian regions. This data set includes information on nominal gross
regional product (GRP), GRP growth, industrial production volume and industrial
production growth, urbanisation level (measured as percent of city dwellers in total
regional population), consumer price growth, number of heavy crimes and share of
population with incomes below poverty level. From this data, we have constructed a
real GRP per head variable by, first, deflating nominal GRP using regional GRP price
growth figures and later dividing by the population count.
Information on institutional variables was sourced from a leading Russian Rank-
ing Agency, Expert RA. Their measurement of institutional quality, calculated in the
form of regional indices, provides an indication of the business environment influencing
business decisions, foremost the decision to enter a market. The agency calculates two
sets of indices. One, the economic risk index, measures the likelihood of losing one’s
investment or profits derived from investment. The other, the economic potential index,
takes into account each region’s macroeconomic standing. In total, 17 different indices
are provided, each representing a weighted sum of several indicators6. The indices are
a combination of quantitative measures and qualitative information. They are based
on statistics provided by various government agencies and on analysis of regional leg-
6Investment potential includes 8 sub-indexes, and a summary investment potential, namely: Hu-
man Capital (education level); Consumer (Total PPP of the population); Industrial Output; Financial;
Institutional (development of market institutions); Innovation (modernization level, # new innova-
tions); Infrastructure (location, internet, mobile network); Natural Resources (availability of natu-
ral resources); and Summary Investment Potential. Risk Assessment includes 7 sub/indexes, and a
summary risk index, namely: Legislative (regulation); Political (polarization of election outcomes);
Economic; Financial; Social; Criminal; Ecological; and Summary Risk Index.
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Hum. Cap. Cons. Ind. Fin. Inst. Innov. Infrastr. Nat. Res.
Consumer Potential 0.95 1.00
Industrial Output 0.91 0.95 1.00
Financial 0.84 0.87 0.88 1.00
Institutional 0.94 0.93 0.89 0.81 1.00
Innovation 0.83 0.81 0.77 0.68 0.78 1.00
Infrastructure 0.37 0.32 0.26 0.21 0.30 0.54 1.00
Natural Resources 0.31 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.32 0.07 -0.43 1.00
Overall Potential 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.80 0.33 0.41
Table 1: Institutional Potential Indexes (2000): Correlation Table
islative documents and press articles. The weights attributed to different indicators
which compose each of the 17 indices are determined through a survey of managers and
specialists in both Russian and international consulting firms. For example, legislative
risk index is based on analysis of legislative documents enacted by regional govern-
ment bodies, and takes into account establishment of free economic zones, as well as
the extent of regulation of production activities and investment. Political risk index re-
flects polarisation of election outcomes, political inclinations of regional heads, political
views of the electorate, popularity of local administration, ethnic tensions, court action
undertaken against regional government and cabinet reshuﬄes. Similarly, social risk
is a composite measure of poverty levels, living costs and the state of regional heating
system. Crime risk index reflects the number of murders and serious crimes committed
in the region, while economic risk index measures economic stability and development
of market institutions. Likewise, human capital potential reflects educational level of
the population in a given region, while industrial potential takes account of industrial
output produced in the region. The 17 indices are provided in form of a rank and thus
constitute an ordinal measure of quality of regional institutions7.
Despite evident shortcomings, such as the subjectivity of weights, these data are
well suited for our needs as they approximate institutions likely to hinder or promote
entry of new firms. However, these indexes are correlated with each other, as shown
in Tables 1 and 2. Among investment potential rank indexes only natural resources
and infrastructure are relatively uncorrelated with the overall index, while the other
indicators show a correlation above 0.80. On a slightly different note, the risk rank
shows a more idiosyncratic pattern, whereby ecological risk is relatively uncorrelated
whilst all the others tend to move together.
We are able to exploit regional variations in Russia because regional authorities
have significant discretion in such areas of joint responsibility as ownership, land use
and management, mineral resources, as well as in establishing general principles of
7The only exception is an additional overall regional risk index, which is a cardinal measure.
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Legislative Political Economic Financial Social Criminal Ecological
Political -0.03 1.00
Economic 0.00 0.41 1.00
Financial 0.07 0.39 0.46 1.00
Social 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.27 1.00
Criminal 0.15 -0.04 0.06 0.43 0.42 1.00
Ecological 0.01 -0.31 -0.38 -0.46 0.18 -0.11 1.00
Overall Risk 0.40 0.28 0.27 0.58 0.70 0.59 0.07
Table 2: Institutional Risk Indexes (2000): Correlation Table
taxes and levies. Moreover, regional authorities have formal power and responsibil-
ity over local financial aid and subsidies, government procurement, investment and
trade promotion, control over natural resources, environment protection and licensing.
Control over these areas has led to significant diversity in regional legislation and ad-
ministrative practices affecting entry of new firms into the market. The OECD (2002)
report on trading policy in Russian regions illustrates the diversity of institutional
setting. For example, Cheliabinsk oblast introduced additional procedures and higher
fees than those stipulated by federal law for such activities as employment services,
international tourism, passenger transportation as well as production and marketing
of alcohol. Primorskiy krai decreed higher fees for licensing pharmaceuticals, while
Nizhny Novgorod extended licensing requirements for engineering systems, building
and road maintenance. The republics of Udmurtia and Mordova introduced regional
certification of companies, effectively restricting entry.
As Table 3 demonstrates, the differences in institutional and economic variables
are large between regions and over time. Thus, while one of the risk-free regions,
Moscow city, has an investment risk index of 0.71 (low count denoting low risk for this
index), Briansk region has an index of 1.65, more than two times that of Moscow city.
The subset of indicators, which constitute investment risk index shows a similar diver-
gence. While Novgorod region recorded a total of 2.69 murders and attempted murders
per each 10,000 of its population in 2002, Moscow city registered only 1.23. Similarly,
while Moscow city is one of the regions registering high on economic potential index
with 18.28 in 2002, Briansk scores low with an index of 0.60 in 2002. Likewise, while
Moscow city leads with a number of patents granted per 10000 population, Briansk
and Novgorod are lagging behind. In fact, the number of patents in Moscow adjusted
by population count, granted in 2002, exceeds those granted in Novgorod in the same
year by 8 times and those granted in Briansk by 23 times.
Variation across time is also considerable. For example the share of insolvent
enterprises in the total number of regional enterprises and organizations grew from 39
percent in 2000 in Briansk to 50 percent in 2002. At the same time, the number of
9
Briansk Krasnodar Novgorod Moscow city
2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002
1) Ec. Pot. 0,64 0,60 2,10 2,04 0,48 0,48 16,97 18,28
2) Vol. Inn. 1269 3882 28 553 11659 28122 11390 3430
3) N◦ patents 0,181 0,145 0,527 0,894 0,344 0,403 4,889 3,337
4) Motorways 178 184 137 143 156 158 n/a n/a
5) Exp.& Sav. 1116 2168 1675 3130 1590 2718 10826 17209
6) Risk index 1,65 1,26 0,83 0,90 0,76 0,73 0,71 0,74
7) Murders 1,36 1,40 1,72 1,37 2,45 2,69 1,32 1,23
8) Ec. crimes 24 21 14 13 20 26 28 20
9) Insolvency 39,10 50 28,70 31,70 44,00 44,90 26,50 28,80
10) Pop.(’000) 1438 1379 5007 5124 727 695 8537 10358
Table 3: Regional Differences in Institutional and Economic Variables.1 Economic potential
(share in total); 2 Volume of innovative products, Rb thousand per 10000 population; 3 Number of patents granted per 10000 population; 4
Density of motorways, km per 1000km2 of region’s territory; 5 Nominal expenditure and savings, Rb; 6 Risk index, Russia=1; 7 Number of
murders and attempted murders per 10000 population; 8 Number of economic crimes per 10000 population; 9 Share of insolvent enterprises
in the total number of enterprises and organizations (%); 10 Population, thousand.
patents granted per 10000 population in Krasnodar grew from 28 to 553 (however, this
might be endogenous to entry). The change in summary indices, reflecting a change
in institutional quality in the period of 2000-2002, is quite noticeable in a number of
regions. From 2000 to 2002, the investment risk index for Briansk improved by 0.385
from 1.645 to 1.260, and for Smolensk it improved by 0.347 from 1.287 to 0.940. At the
same time Koriak autonomous region and Tyumen region fared worse in the summary
investment risk index. Koriak autonomous region saw its investment risk increase by
0.680 points from 1.690 to 2.370 and Tyumen region saw investment risk grow from
0.970 to 1.210.
In addition to differences in formal regulation, regional authorities exercise infor-
mal control over local market institutions, which affect ease of creating and operating
a firm. As a result, the number of inspections and the costs of obtaining a license may
differ from one region to another. For example, an average small company in Kurgan
oblast in 2001 was inspected 10 times compared to 2.5 times in Samara oblast over the
same time period (CEFIR (2007)).
4 Estimation Strategy
We use two measures of the entry rate; entry over one year and entry spanning a two
year period. Entry 1 year rate is the number of companies with incorporation year
= T divided by the number of companies with the incorporation year ≤ T . Entry 2
10
years rate is the number of companies with incorporation year = T or T −1 divided by
the number of companies with the incorporation year ≤ T . We compute entry within
the same industry, region and year: industries are denoted by the subscript i, i.e. 58
Nace 2 digit industries dummies (excluding such sectors as agriculture, mining, utility,
financial intermediation and public administration); regions are denoted by r, i.e. 87
regions dummies (Nenets AO and Komi Permiatsk AO are missing); time is denoted
by t, i.e. year 2000, 2001 and 20028.
The dataset provides a large number of observations, distributed across virtually
all Russian regions, and allows us to observe the formal act of entry since it provides the
date of firm’s registration. However, incorporation in the early years of the transition
might mostly indicate privatisation, but, since our dataset covers the 2000-2002 period,
we avoid this pitfall, as the dominant share of Russian economy was privatized by 1997.
We also cannot distinguish between new entry and legal change of name, which may
have occurred in later years. The legal change of name, however, is often a result of
change of ownership and thus represents a new way of recombining a firm’s resources
and introduction of a new strategy. While this does not constitute a de novo entry as
such, it still often signifies entry of a new player or a new approach to the market.
There may be problems for the measure of entry rates for small firms, defined as
those with less then 50 workers. The number of small firms entering in the unregistered
big informal sector is likely to be very large, and this would not be captured by our self-
declared year of incorporation variable. Therefore, we also estimated our econometric
models on a four dimensional database (region, industry, year and firm-size), which
increases the size of the sample and captures the differential effect of institutions on
entry-size categories. In fact, the new LHS variable is defined in the following way:
entry 1 year rate is the number of companies with incorporation year = T of a specific
size category divided by the number of companies with the incorporation year ≤ T of
the same size category. We decided to adopt the standard size taxonomy of s1 < 50,
s2 = [51− 250], s3 > 250.
The measurement of entry therefore exploits three dimensions: time, industry,
and regional variation. Table 4 reports Russian entry rates by year with international
comparisons. It is noteworthy to highlight the similarity of entry rates values between
countries: Russia appears to register ”Western levels” entry rates in the 2000-2002
period and higher rates than a comparable transition country, Ukraine. However, note
that high entry rates do not imply high survival rates. In fact net entry rates could
well be different among Russia and Western economies (see Brown and Earle (2006)
8The theoretical overall number of data of the database is therefore 3 x 58 x 87 = 15138. However
there are missing industries in some regions. Our dataset contains over 5000 observations and over
9000 when we account for the size effect.
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and Rutkowski and Scarpetta (2005))9. Table 5 and 6 report entry rates for Russia,
Ukraine, Europe and USA by 2-digit industries.
In order to test the relationship between entry and institutions, we run a Tobit
estimation 10 model for the truncated [0.1] LHS entry variable computed from the year
of incorporation declared by the firm11. We exploit the Klapper, Laeven and Rajan
(2006) methodology drawn from the difference in difference approach used by Rajan
and Zingales (1998) by including the interaction term [Institutionr,t−1×Nat−Entryi].
This specification is equivalent to testing whether institutions affect differently entry
rates given the ”natural entry rate” 12, the latter reflecting the long run barriers to
entry pertaining in a developed market economy. The specification includes macro
regions fixed effects (out of 87 oblast, the regions are grouped in 13 macro-groups, by
following an administrative criteria adopted by the central government, DMr ∈ [1, 13]),
industry fixed effects (53 Nace 2-digit industries, excluding agriculture, mining, utility,
financial intermediation and public administration that show a structurally lower entry
rate, Di ∈ [1, 53]), time fixed effects (3 years, Dt ∈ [1, 3]) as well as Goskomstat regional
variables Xr,t−1, namely13: logarithm of the value added at the level of the sector and
region (at time t)14; logarithm of the population at the level of the region (at time t-1);
logarithm of the industrialization rate (at time t-1); logarithm of the gross regional
product per capita at 2000 constant prices (at time t-1); logarithm of the growth rate
of the gross regional product (at time t-1); logarithm of the % city population (at time
t-1); logarithm of the % of people below the poverty line (at time t-1); logarithm of
the crime rate on 1000 inhabitants (at time t-1).
We also performed two main robustness checks as far as the measurement of
institutions and the natural entry rates are concerned: institutions variables are loaded,
either as potential or as risk ranking and natural entry rates are sourced either from
USA or EU data15.
9The corresponding values for the 2 years entry rate, show similar patterns between Ukraine,
Europe and USA, whilst Russia entry rates are higher. This is most probably due to the post 1998
shake-out effect: the number of firms re-entering the market in the 1999 and 2000 year were abnormally
high due to the rebound from the end of the crisis, and therefore can hardly be considered a long run
steady-state value.
10Bootstrapped S.E. with 100 repetitions.
11Date of incorporation reported by a sub-sample of around 15%.
12For example, consider two sectors only, with natural entry rates of 0 and 1, respectively. The
interaction term [Institutionr,t−1×1 = Institutionr,t−1] will capture exactly the impact of institutions
on the 100% entry sector with respect to the no entry one [Institutionr,t−1 × 0 = 0].
13The selected regional variables show a correlation level below a 0.5.
14It captures an industry specific convergence effect: we correct for the possibility that sectors that
are large relative to the rest of the economy experience lower entry rates
15Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2004) analyse entry determinants using both
structural variables and exogenous variation via instrumental variable estimation, in order to tackle
potential reverse causality (entry might improve institutions). We might also be subject to reverse
12
The following model is estimated (the subscript ”i” stands for industry, ”r” stands
for region, ”Mr” stands for macro-region and ”t” stands for time, bold variables indicate
matrices or vectors):
The Baseline Regression
Entryr,i,t = σ(Instr,t−1 ×Nat− Entryi)
+
R∑
Mr=1
βMrDMr +
I∑
i=1
βiDi
+
T∑
t=1
βtDt +BXr,t−1 + ²r,i,t (1)
The Firm Size Effect Regression
Entryr,i,s,t =
3∑
s=1
σs(Instr,t−1 ×Nat− Entryi)
+
R∑
Mr=1
3∑
s=1
βMr,sDMr,s +
I∑
i=1
3∑
s=1
βi,sDi,s
+
T∑
t=1
βtDt +BXr,t−1 + ²r,i,s,t (2)
Size Categories: s1 < 50, s2 = [51− 250], s3 > 250
Il the latter equation the regional RHS variables and the time dummies are un-
modified, whilst the interaction term between institutions and the natural entry rate,
as well as the macro-region, and industry dummies, are included for all the 3 size
categories 16.
5 Results
The results of the estimation of the two basic regressions 1 and 2 are reported in
Tables 7 and 8, respectively. The dependent variable is the 1 year entry rate17. Table
7 concerns the three dimensional data base (region, industry and time), whilst Table 8
causality if a sector-region specific entry rate potentially affect the institutional environment of the
whole region, that we think to be unlikely. However, we are aware that this effect cannot be excluded.
16See for example Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007).
17We also checked for the use of 2 years entry rate as LHS variable, as explained in the text. The
conclusions are fully consistent with the 1 year entry results (available on request).
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concerns the four dimensional data base (region, industry, time and size). Each table
reports four columns, according to the different specification of the interaction term:
(1) Overall Potential indicator interacted with USA natural entry rates by sector; (2)
Overall Risk indicator interacted with USA natural entry rates by sector; (3) Overall
Potential indicator interacted with EU natural entry rates by sector; (4) Overall Risk
indicator interacted with EU natural entry rates by sector. In fact, we are interested
in studying the sign of the σ and σs coefficients in equations 1 and 2, respectively
18.
Do Institutions matter? A major issue for our empirical work concerns whether
industries characterised by higher ’natural entry rates’ will suffer relatively more in
terms of entry if based in regions with low investment potential (high investment risk).
Since a high value for the institutional variables indicates worst regions, a negative
sign on the interaction term would corroborate this hypothesis. In order to answer the
question, we should therefore look at the top panel of table 7. The estimated coefficients
for all columns are negative and significant and are in the range 0.012 - 0.028. We can
interpret the relationship between institutions and entry by using a numerical example:
within an industry characterised by a natural entry rate of around 10% (for example
the computer service sector, 10.73%, table 5, part II), an increase in the investment
constraints of 10 positions (in the regional ranking list) entails a decrease of entry rates
of around 1.2 - 2.8%19. However the institutional constraint should be interpreted as a
short run effect, with the expectation that the computer service sector would converge,
eventually, to its long run natural entry rate; in a perfect world of no institutional
differences among regions, we should observe each sector approaching its natural entry
rate.
Do institutions affect different firm size in different ways? The top panel of
Table 8 further investigates the relationship between institutions and entry, by looking
18The regressions controlling for industry fixed effects, time fixed effects and 87 Regions fixed effects
(instead of the 13 Macro Regions fixed effect) wash out all the effect for the institutional and regional
variables, because of the relatively short time span of the sample (3 years), i.e. the Goskomstat and
Expert RA institutional variables at the level of the region do not show sufficient time variation in
order to be statistically different from a sheer regional fixed effects. Including 87 fixed effect dummies
and those regional variables would generate multicollinearity.
19We also looked at regressions based on sub-indexes, results available on request. For the In-
stitutional Potential Rank and Criminal Risk Rank sub-indexes there is a positive and significant
coefficient on the interaction term. This is not surprising given the fact the former is account-
ing for the number of entrepreneurs not registered as legal entity (informal sector), and this is
strongly influenced by the under-estimation of small firms entry. The latter is highly correlated
with mafia and network activities (Centre for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic
School (2007), Monitoring the Administrative Barriers to Small Business Development in Russia.
Round 6, http://www.cefir.ru/index.php?l=eng&id=260.) and therefore higher ”corruption” could,
paradoxically, enhance entry.
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Countries NACE One Year Entry Rate
Russia 15-93 7.02%
(2000-2002) 1-93 6.79%
Ukraine 15-93 5.52%
(2000-2004) 1-93 5.80%
Europe 15-93 7.09%
(1998-1999)
U.S.A. 15-93 6.65%
(1998-1999)
Sources: Ruslana for Russia and Ukraine, Dun and Bradstreet for Europe and USA.
Table 4: Comparing Entry Rates
at the effect of the interaction between regional institutions and natural entry rate for
three firm size categories. We believe that firm dimension could well drive the above
mentioned relationship, due to differences in institutions. Two results are notewor-
thy. First, the estimated coefficients for all columns are negative and significant in the
medium and big firm category, whilst the small sized firm coefficient is not always sig-
nificant. Second, the magnitude of the coefficients - included in a range between 0.013
- 0.045 - shows that small firms (with 0-50 employees) appear to be less constrained by
the institutional context, while medium (51-250 employees) and large firms (over 250
employees) show moderate and high responsiveness, respectively. Summing up, there
is a limited effect of institutions on small firms’ entry. If we consider medium and big
firms, the latter are the most affected by adverse business environment. These results
are consistent with the fact that small firms’ entry rates are underestimated and that
small firms tend to rely relatively more on informal institutions, as pointed out by
Aidis and Estrin (2006) and Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2008).
Do structural variables matter? As far as the structural regional variables are
concerned, we should look at the bottom panel (structural Xr,t−1) of tables 7 and 8.
The value added variable is always negative and significant , and this is a signal that
there is an industry specific convergence effect: sectors that are relatively large in the
region register less entry (as in Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006)). There is a positive
effect of the size of urban population and a negative effect of the industrialization (less
industrialized regions register higher entry rates). The coefficients on poverty and
crime are negative, and the coefficients on GRP per capita and population size are
positive, but not always significant. Surprisingly, the regional level of growth (GRP
growth) does not appear to affect on entry though this could also be a consequence of
the limited time span of the data base. Structural variables are therefore important in
explaining the overall process of opening a new business in Russian regions.
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6 Conclusions
We exploited a comprehensive database on Russian firms to compute entry rates by
region, industry and time. We find Russian entry rates are not in fact low by inter-
national standards - when small firms are included in the dataset - and are high in
comparison with Ukraine. This runs counter to expectations in the literature (Aidis
and Adachi (2007)). We go on to show that entry rates can be explained by structural
barriers as well as institutional determinants at the level of the region. We regress
the entry LHS variable in a Tobit model by exploiting regional and time variations of
RHS variables on hard economic data as well as soft institutional indicators. On the
one hand, the regional levels of industrialisation, urbanisation, poverty and registered
crime do impinge significantly on entry. On the other hand, we demonstrate that entry
is negatively affected by the business environment, which we interpret as reflecting
the quality of regions’ institutions. We show that industries which, for technological
and structural reasons, are characterized by high ’natural entry rates’ will experience
lower entry rates in regions with higher business risk (lower business potential). These
results are robust to: the use of both the one year entry and two year entry rates as
LHS variable; the use of both the EU and the USA entry rates by industry as a proxy
for natural entry rates; the use of both the risk rank indicators and potential rank
indicators as RHS. When the firm size dimension of the database is further exploited,
a higher relative effect of entry barriers for medium and large firms prevails. This
could be partially explained by the fact that small firms tend to rely more on informal
institutions.
It is not necessarily the case that our findings indicate competitive processes are
healthy in Russia. While entry rates are high in Russia, it is possible that exit rates
are also high, implying low net entry rates and a rather limited impact of competitive
pressures on the behaviour of incumbents. This is consistent with the view of Geroski
(1995),
’it is a little difficult to reconcile high entry barriers with high entry rates,
not least because entry are commonly thought of as an obstacle which
prevent firms from entering a market. If, however, barriers to entry are
thought of as an obstacle which prevents new firms from surviving long in
the market, then the data present less that a puzzle’.
Dosi and Lovallo (2000) quote Geroski (1991) and Geroski (1995) in their review
of the four major stylized facts emerging from the literature on entry: 1) there is
low survival rate for new entrants; 2) different measures of entry (gross, net, entry
rates, penetration rates) are not correlated among themselves (however, entry rates
16
tend to be very correlated with exit rates); 3) different type of entrants (e.g. de novo
vs. diversifying; low vs. high tech industry) imply different probability of success; 4)
the effect of entry on market performance is fairly modest. Dosi and Lovallo (2000)
provide an interesting perspective on the link between nature of the decision biases of
individuals and organizations and the pattern of corporate entry, exit and industrial
dynamics, that is missing in other part of the literature. This appears to be of particular
importance in the analysis of transition countries such as Russia, burdened by uncertain
and fast changing business environment and institutions.
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EFFECT of INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES on ENTRY
Dependent variable: Entry Rates (r,i,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interaction: Pot.R.-USA Risk.R.-USA Pot.R.-EU Risk.R.-EU
(Inr,t−1 ×Ei) -0.028*** -0.012** -0.020** -0.013***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
DMr♦ Y Y Y Y
Di♦ Y Y Y Y
Dt♦ Y Y Y Y
Structural Xr,t−1:
Value Added\ -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.044***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Population 0.012 0.056*** 0.022 0.056***
(0.021) (0.010) (0.020) (0.011)
Industrialisation -0.336*** -0.287*** -0.323*** -0.288***
(0.068) (0.055) (0.071) (0.056)
GRP pc 0.003 -0.004 0.005 -0.006
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
GRP growth 0.146 0.159 0.146 0.163
(0.120) (0.126) (0.123) (0.135)
% City Pop. 0.434** 0.475*** 0.444*** 0.478***
(0.189) (0.158) (0.162) (0.184)
% Poverty -0.249** -0.280** -0.254* -0.282**
(0.125) (0.134) (0.137) (0.129)
% Crime -0.159 -0.167 -0.165 -0.167
(0.188) (0.201) (0.180) (0.166)
Obs. 5069 5069 5069 5069
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
Table 7: Tobit Regression: LHS One year Entry Rate in the region, industry and
year. Bootstrapped S.E. in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at ***p=.01, **p=.05
and *p=.10. ♦ The null hypothesis of joint zero coefficients for the DMr, Di and Dt,
respectively, is always rejected. \ The Value Added variable is sector-specific and at
time t, i.e. V Ar,i,t.
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EFFECT of INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES on ENTRY by SIZE CATEGORIES
Dependent variable: Entry Rate (r,i,t,s)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interaction: Pot.R.-USA Risk.R.-USA Pot.R.-EU Risk.R.-EU
[Inr,t−1 × Ei]× s1 0.014 -0.013* 0.005 -0.015**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
[Inr,t−1 × Ei]× s2 -0.035** -0.022* -0.035*** -0.025***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009)
[Inr,t−1 × Ei]× s3 -0.051*** -0.032*** -0.045*** -0.030***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
DMr,s♦ Y Y Y Y
Di,s♦ Y Y Y Y
Dt♦ Y Y Y Y
Structural Xr,t−1:
Val. Added\ -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.068***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Population 0.009 0.032*** 0.002 0.031***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012)
Industrialisation -0.237*** -0.169*** -0.239*** -0.172***
(0.060) (0.066) (0.075) (0.063)
GRP pc 0.055** 0.041* 0.053** 0.040*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
GRP growth 0.029 0.073 0.037 0.078
(0.129) (0.153) (0.153) (0.147)
% City Pop. 0.526*** 0.450*** 0.512*** 0.449***
(0.137) (0.134) (0.131) (0.133)
% Poverty -0.059 -0.085 -0.061 -0.084
(0.143) (0.140) (0.161) (0.142)
% Crime -0.278* -0.145 -0.277* -0.118
(0.158) (0.185) (0.165) (0.155)
Obs. 9861 9861 9861 9861
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Table 8: Tobit Regression: LHS One year Entry Rate in the region, industry, year and
size category. Bootstrapped S.E. in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at ***p=.01,
**p=.05 and *p=.10. ♦ The null hypothesis of joint zero coefficients for the DMr,s, Di,s
and Dt, respectively, is always rejected. \ The Value Added variable is sector-specific
and at time t, i.e. V Ar,i,t.
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